Parmenides

In an attempt to update this thing more regularly, I thought I would discuss a really compelling argument I recently read for my History of Ancient class. It is actually three separate arguments that have been strung together.The interpretation of the argument is Matt Evan’s: 

(P1) One cannot think (of) what is not. 

(P2) If one cannot think (of) what is not, then the object of thought is what is.

(P3) So the object of thought is what is. (P1, P2)

(P4) If the object of thought is generated, then it comes to be from what is not; and if it is perishable, then it comes to be what is not.

(P5) Nothing comes to be from what is not, and nothing comes to be what is not.

(P6) So the object of thought is ungenerated and imperishable. (P4, P5)

(P7) If the object of thought changes, then either it comes to be something that it is not, or it comes to be from something that it is not.

(P8) If what is comes to be from something that it is not, then it comes to be from what is not; and if what is comes to be something that it is not, then it comes to what is not. 

(P9) So the object of thought is changeless. (P5,P7 and P8)

There are a number of ways the argument can be interpreted, depending on how one interprets the what/it and the is of the premises. Each of these words has a number of possible readings and the particular meanings consequentially yield different meanings of the argument. 

What (it): the subject of this inquiry (fundamental reality) OR the subject of any inquiry OR the object of knowledge/what is known

(is): existential OR predicative OR speculative predicative (describes essential nature) OR veridical 

So then the three conclusions from the argument can vary greatly (even in truth/falsity) depending on how one reads Parmenides. 

The first conclusion doesn’t seem to be too revolutionary. Parmenides seems to be saying that it is impossible to think of nothing (P1) and if one can’t think of nothing, then one’s thought must be then of something. (P2) This claim seems to be rather intuitive. So the object of thought IS something. (P3) It could also be read that the object of thought/the object of this inquiry is fundamental reality. In which case, Parmenides is giving a positive account of reality as being something which is necessarily not a nothing. Either way, it doesn’t seem that this part of the argument is open to much debate.

The next conclusion is that something cannot be generated from nothing and conversely, something cannot become nothing/nonexistent. This too, seems rather simple for us to understand. One could appeal to conservatory laws of physics to support this claim. (P3) Says that if the object of thought is produced, then it comes from nothing and if it can perish, it comes to be nothing. This seems sounds. In (P4), however, Parmenides claims that nothing comes from what is not and nothing comes to be what is not. And from these two premises it follows that something cannot come from nothing and likewise cannot come to be nothing. This is a revolutionary argument that challenged the ancient world-view. Any claims about reality being created by a Creator have just been refuted in one fell swoop. It’s not clear how a Greek would response to this argument or on what grounds it could be found faulty. It seems that the most weight is on (P5) where Parmenides puts forth that something cannot come from nothing and vise versa, although it is extremely difficult to say what is wrong with this premise (if anything). 

The final third of the argument is by far the trickiest. (P7) basically claims that if something changes, then it becomes something it is not (was not?) or it comes to be from something it is not. In (P8), Parmenide shows that if something/what is comes to be from something it is not – then it necessarily comes to be what is not/nothing. (The only mode of existence other than what is is what is not.) Similarly, if what is comes to be from something that it is not; then it comes to be from what is not. However, Parmenides already showed in (P6) that an object cannot come from what is not nor can it come to be what is not. Thus it follows, that the object of thought is changeless. (P9) 

Perhaps an example would help illustrate the last third of the argument. I’ll give this my best shot. Take for example, an unripe (green) orange to be what is. (P7) If the unripe orange changes (ripens), then either it comes to be something it is not (an orange orange) or it comes to be from something it is not. (P8) So if the green orange becomes an orange orange – in a sense the green orange has become a nothing or nonexistent. Even if one objected and just said that it’s still the same orange, Parmenides would say that the now orange orange came to be from something that it is not, and the only thing that is not what is is necessarily what is not, or nothing. Thus, (P9) the unripe orange is changeless.

This is a strange argument in that it seems like it can’t be right but is difficult to say where the problem lies. I think the problem has something to do with equating nothingness with the orange orange. When the green orange becomes an orange orange, there is a sense that the property of greenness simply changing to orangeness. Parmenides seems to assert that the green orange goes out of existence altogether. So it may just be a problem of putting to strong of a constraint on change playing an overly important role in existence. 

However, if one substitutes the argument with the reading of ‘fundamental reality’ for ‘what is’ – it makes for a more compelling argument in that there is a sense in which fundamental reality is changeless on the grand scale.  This is some pretty impressive reasoning for an ancient greek.

I appologize for the incoherence. Its late and I’m tired.

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