Interactionism

Paper arguing for interactionist dualism. 

Upon reflecting on our daily experience, it certainly feels we have a mental life that directly influences and causes events in the physical world. It seems when we make choices or mental decisions, they often become actualized in the physical world. Conversely, the physical world appears to influence our thoughts and choices. It is for these reasons that interactionism is the most reasonable position for the dualist to hold. The interactionist would like to preserve this common-sensical appearance of two-way causal interaction. The physicalists have many arguments against interactionism, often backing the interactionist into a more inane form of dualism such as epiphenomenalism. However, because interactionism is the ideal form of dualism, I will defend it by examining the most troublesome physicalist argument against interactionism: over-determinism. I will argue that the whole concept of over-determinism is fundamentally flawed and thus poses no real threat to the interactionist.

            The physicalist claims the world is causally closed, because there is sound, empirical evidence that everything that happens in the observable world has an earlier physical cause. Take for example, a man tasting a cube of sugar. Asked what the man experiences, he would answer, “sweetness”. According to the physicalist, this response would have been causally determined first by placing the sugar in his mouth, followed by chemical reactions that take place in special receptor cells called ‘taste buds’, and finally by various complicated neural activities in the brain. The final result is the articulation of the man’s experience of sweetness. Even in complicated situations such as this one, the materialist appears to have no problem showing that all events are determined by earlier physical causes. However, the interactionist proposes that not only is there physical causation, but also non-physical causation. Mental activity becomes actualized in the physical world, thus causing physical events (and vise versa). In other words, the physical world is not causally closed. The dualist believes it is not just the chemical brain activity that causes the man to respond, “sweetly”, but also the mental experience of sweetness. We can conclude the man’s verbal response has two causes: the physical happenings in his brain, and the immaterial or mental experience of taste. However, in response to the  introduction of mental causation, the physicalist claims that many events become consequently over-determined. Instead of events having the one necessary cause, happenings in the physical world thus have two sufficient causes, one physical and one non-physical. The physicalist further believes the mental causation to be superfluous insofar as the world can function merely by physical causation alone.

            But what complications does over-determination cause insofar as the mental causation is always consistent with the physical? The dualist could argue that even if the physical world is causally determined, the mental world does not disrupt this ordering insofar as mental causation coincides with physical causes. So then what is so inherently problematic about events having multiple causes? It is not enough for the physicalist to say that world simply doesn’t need mental causation. Although it is generally good to eliminate unnecessary factors in trying to understand the metaphysical nature of reality, merely stating that mental causation is unnecessary and only complicates the world would not be a compelling argument against the dualist.

             The physicalist might respond by pointing out the strangeness of the world being over-determined on a universally widespread and reoccurring nature. Almost every obscure happening on the human level (assuming humans are the only beings with mental life) would be over-determined if interactionism is true. Every human event that involves some sort of non-physical experience would be over-determined. Not only is widespread over-determination very strange, it is also highly improbable. If, as current physics proposes, the physical world is indeterministic and instead probababalistic, it seems highly unlikely that physical causation should remain perfectly parallel with mental causation for all of time. Further, what force keeps the mental causation parallel to the physical causation, and more importantly, what would happen something disrupted the synchronicity? If our example’s mental life became causally disconnected with his physical life, perhaps he would taste sugar bluely our loudly instead of sweetly? At first glance, objections such as these seem to pose a serious problem for the interactionist.

            I will argue on behalf of the dualist that there is, in fact, no over-determination. Although the physicalists can raise some interesting questions about the over-determination of the world, it seems to me that this objection to dualism essentially misses the point. By intending to show that the world is over-determined, on the interactionist’s theory, the physicalist greatly misunderstands or misrepresents the dualist view. I would argue that by accepting the scientific dogma that the world is causally closed to be truth, the materialists attack on interactionism falsely presupposes the dualist will agree with this premise. In showing the world to be causally closed, the physicalist hopes to convince the dualist there is no room for mental causation. The dualist, however, should defend his view by pointing out that appearance is not necessarily reality. Although it appears the observable world is causally closed, the interactionists claim it is not. Unless the materialist can convince the dualist that the man’s response of sweetness is directly caused only by some chemical happening in his brain (and not the actual experience of sweetness), he fails in proving the world is over-determined. The dualist believes that there must be a soul for experience because there is no substantial evidence that the physical can consciously experience anything, including sweetness. The physicalist’s argument of over-causation ultimately becomes an argument over what it is to experience, and insofar as he is unable to prove that the physical can somehow experience; he fails to convince the dualist of over-determinism. In direct response to the claim that the neural activity is what causes the man to speak, the dualist could simply propose that the brain state is merely the necessary condition for the immaterial soul to experience sweetness, which in turn causes the man’s response. Thus, the brain (physical) satisfies the necessary condition for the experience (mental), which then causes the man to articulate (physical) his experience. We could conclude that not only is interactionism feasible, but also necessary for the world to work. Therefore, the argument for over-determinsim is only compelling for those who accept the physical world to be causally closed, not the dualists.

(NYU year 2 Central Problems of Philosophy)

Compatibilism

Here’s a short paper I just wrote in defense of compatibilism:

Until roughly two hundred years ago, we lived in a decidedly deterministic world. According to Newtonian science, all physical matter is subject to physical laws. Assuming that human beings are physical beings, we too were thought to be subject to these deterministic laws. However, with the introduction of quantum theory, science admitted that, at best, the world is probabilistic, replacing determinism with the randomness that is indeterminism. However, an indeterministic world does not necessarily constitute the existence of free will. Randomness at a subatomic level makes it no easier for humans to do any sort of real choosing.  Moreover, the observable world is so probabilistic it may be more accurate to simply call it deterministic. Bt even assuming that all physical events are determined by earlier physical causes, I would still argue that it is possible to make free choices. Any sort of free will we could possibly want is entirely compatible with a deterministic or probabilistic universe.

            The compatibilist suggests that determinism is true in that all events have earlier causes and thus all events are causally determined. However, unlike hard determinists, the compatibilist supposes that choosing is still possible within a causally determined world. The compatibilist account of freedom is as follows:

1.     A person does x.

2.     The person wanted and chose to do x.

3.     The person had several options available; thus he/she could have done otherwise, but made this choice because he/she wanted to.

 

And so as long as there are no physical constraints preventing someone to choose, thus limiting his available options, he is making free choices. For compatibilism, to be free is to be capable of making alternative choices had you chosen to do so. In order to have chosen to do so, a person would have had to had different causal determinants. So to be free, according to the compatibilist, has to do with having the power to make choices based on causal determinants. There are, of course, cases of people who do not have this sort of freedom. For example, if someone is physically shackled or confined, his or her causal determinants have no bearing in the choices he or she can make. The person is not able to “have done otherwise” even if his causal determinants had been different because he/she is physically incapable of doing so. Thus, his/her wants play no role in the person’s choosing. So it then follows, he or she is not free. A similar point can be made of mental restraints, such as some sort of mental paralysis or hypnosis that prevents a person from choosing. However, if there are none of these mental or physical constraints, the compatibilist account of freedom is fulfilled in following out choosing based on past wants and other causal determinants.

                        Incompatibilists, however, are not satisfied with the soft determinist’s account of freedom. One of the most challenging arguments the soft determinist faces in proposing that determinism and freedom are compatible is Peter Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. The argument looks something like this:

                        1, No one can control the past and no one can control the laws of nature.

                        2. The future is causally determined both by the past and natural law.

                        3. Therefore, no one has any power over the facts of the present/future.

 

Causal determination began at the start of the physical world, perhaps at the Big Bang. Insofar as we are unable to change the billions of year of physical causation, nor the laws these events are subject to; the incompatibilist believes we play no part in choosing the future. The compatibilist must reject this consequence argument altogether, or his views are refuted in one move. The compatibilist rejects the conclusion that no one has power over the present and thus the future. While we undeniably cannot control the past or the laws of nature, it does seem that we are free and have some control in the present moment according the soft determinists. To defend free will, the compatibilist claims that human freedom is entirely situated inside this causal order of nature. Within this view of soft determinism, we control the future by being part of the way in which the past controls the present and thus the future. Take for example a light switch. It is true that the past controls the present and future, and a light switch cannot control the past . Moreover, a light switch cannot control the way that the past controls the future and present. So the hard determinist believes that the light switch cannot control the future. However, the light switch can control the future, with respect to light. That is the very function of the light switch. Thus, like light switches, humans control the future by being part of the way in which the past controls the present and then future. Being part of the causal chain is what gives human beings their control.

            For the sake of clarity and simplicity, let us assume that humans are entirely physical in their existence. To attribute a soul or immaterial property to man’s being is merely speculation and only complicates the issue of free will further (as we would then have to decide which laws apply to the immaterial). Let us examine a hypothetical case of a man named John. John is confronted with two apparent choices, to speak or to remain silent for example. Perhaps the choice lies in a split pathway in the brain. If John’s neurons fire to the left, he speaks but if they fire right, he remains silent. It appears that John has no choice in the matter whatsoever. He cannot control the electrical or chemical activity of his brain but seems merely to be subject to the physical or probabilistic laws that control the neurons. So all of John’s apparent choices are the result of a probabilistic chemical ‘tug of war’ in his brain in which he plays no active part. Thus we conclude, in this sense, it appears John does not have free will. Just as an apple has no choice but to fall from a tree, John too is subject to the laws of physics.

            However, I think it is metaphysically unfair to compare John, an object with consciousness, to a simple physical object. The apple has no choice because it does not have the capacity to experience choice in the first place. It is only propensitied with boring physical qualities. John, however, appears to have far more complex powers and is thus able to entertain the idea of choosing. Of course, this experience of choosing could merely be illusion, but admittedly I think it is more. I would argue that John is the one making the choice insofar as he brain activity happening around the choice is John’s brain activity.  There are many factors influencing John’s choice including his wants and desires, past experiences, inclinations, etc. All of these factors are John’s and John’s alone. These factors all are part of John’s identity and therefore must play a role in his decision-making. John does not exist outside all of these happenings in his brain, but rather is his brain. The materialist advocates of physical determinism would likely agree with this point. So then, perhaps the problem of free choice lies in a misunderstanding or disagreement on personal identity. But if the materialist agrees that to be John is for there to be some psycho-physical continuity, then it seems it is John who is choosing. It is precisely John’s psychological continuity (desires, wants, experiences) that cause his physical body to make choices. And insofar as John is some combination of his psychological and physical continuity – it is John choosing. And although physical laws limit his choices, it certainly is not physical laws that are choosing. Because he may not be consciously aware of his minute brain processes or the physical laws they are subject to, does not mean that the choices made are not fully his. It is arbitrary whether John can explain his choices on a sub-atomic level or not.  It is precisely John’s subjective experience, the combination of all his desires, predispositions, and personal history – acting in accordance with physical laws – that determine which path John’s neurons will fire. And insofar as all these qualities are propensities of John or John’s brain – John is really choosing. The apple, however, does not experience wants, needs, and inclinations and lacks the capacity to choose in the first place is therefore totally determined by physical laws. Thus we can conclude that while both conscious and simple physical objects are subject to the same laws, and thus lacking some kind of ultimate freedom perhaps, John’s complexity appears to enable him to really do some choosing.

            Perhaps more can be said about the role consciousness plays in human freedom. Although both John and the apple are both physical objects, causally determined by past physical events, John appears to still have some choice within these confines. I do not propose that consciousness is beyond the sphere of physicality or somehow deems John exempt from physical law, but there does seem to be some intuitive mystery or complexity added to the question of choice when consciousness is introduced. In this case, let us still approach consciousness as a physicalist, defining it as the combined functions and capabilities of the brain, both conscious and subconscious. Although it is still subject to physical laws, perhaps consciousness somehow supersedes or overrides its individual comprising processes and is thus able to control them based on a wider perspective. What I mean by this is, perhaps consciousness, which is composed of many neurons firing at once, is somehow able to control which paths its constituent neurons choose based on John’s decisions and experiences. This new control, however, is still subject to physical laws and therefore does not mean the world is indeterministic. Also, these new choices are not random or misguided but rather still based on past experiences and physical laws. John’s choice is still largely based on past events, along with his wants and desires. However, instead of the neuron firing to the right or left being merely a probabilistic happening, John would actually have some choice in the outcome. Thus John, a conscious being, could be in control of his brain activity and responsible for his choice. Admittedly, this proposal is nearly as speculative as belief in the soul, but is only made to show that consciousness complicates the question of choice and will therefore remain mysterious until better understood. It does seem possible, however, for physical beings to make free choice in accordance to the laws of physics.

                        It seems to me that the compatible choosing we do, within this largely deterministic world, is the only type of choosing we could ever want to do. The whole issue of free will seems to be a disagreement over what it is to choose. I would argue that the libertarian definition of real choosing, is not only impossible but not logically coherent. What would it even be to make choices in a truly indeterministic world? The libertarian wants freedom to be a sort of choosing that is not influenced by any past events or conditioning. I would argue that this is not choosing at all however. Our apparent choices, in this sort of world, would be merely random happenings. Insofar as our choices would not be determinately informed by our past experiences, perhaps not even subject to physical laws, we would seem to actually have less control. Although I’m unable to imagine what a world like this would possibly be like, I would assume it’s not choosing in any way we could want. We should want our choices to be made on past experiences, on our desires and our inclinations. The libertarian definition of freedom must then be far too demanding and imaginative.

Free Will Part II: What’s so Bad about Determinism anyways?

In our day to day lives, it certainly seems that we do lots of choosing. This of course, could be mere appearance, but i think our language about decisions and our common-sensical view that we have this power to choose may say something about the nature of reality. Generally, proponents of free will, non-philosophers, are opposed to the idea of a deterministic universe. It seems to constricting. No one likes the idea that our lives are merely being “played out” and that we have no real control. However, I would argue that determinism is really the only way we could possibly want the world to be.

If the world was genuinely indeterministic – not probabilistic - but actually IN-determined, it seems we would have even LESS choice or control. How would we make free choices in a world that is essentially chaotic and unsystematic. In this indeterministic world, there would be no causal connection between events. Supposing we actually have the power to choose in this world, our choices would be completely misguided and random. So although we may have some new metaphysical freedom to genuinely choose between two alternative outcomes, our decision would be a mere shot in the dark. Insofar as are choices are random, it would seem we have even less control than if we had been causally determined. 

Determinism proposes that we make our ‘choices’ based on causal factors that influence our decisions in one direction over the other. So although we are led to a decision by past events, at least this sort of choice is consistent with what we want (or what we think we ought to want). So I would take the position of the compatibilist or soft deterministic in saying that any sort of choosing we could want to make is available within a deterministic universe. Although when observed from an objective, omniscient perspective (omniscient to the point of knowing about every physical simply in the universe since sometime around the Big Bang), human action may be completely predicable; insofar as it feels as though I have the choice of what I’m having for breakfast – I’m satisfied. I would rather be completely fooled by the illusion of choices that are in compliance with my wants and needs than being able to genuinely choose but have no control over what I’m choosing. The sort of absolute freedom the libertarian wants is more than just a pipe dream, it would actually be a sort of chaotic barrier to choosing.

The compatibilist account of freedom: 

1. You did x.

2. You wanted and “chose” to do x. (went through the motion of choosing at least)

3. You had several options available to you. You ‘could have done otherwise’, but you chose x because of 2.

4. If you had “chosen” y instead, you would have done y instead.

So as long as we are not somehow coerced into choosing or physically restricted to making a particular choice, we are free. For now I’m content with this view.

Next time, I’ll post a paper I wrote recently on determinism and choosing.

Free Will Part I: Determinism vs. Indeterminism

In this post I will discuss briefly some issues of free will I have been reading about. I have been unsure where to begin with the blog so I figure I’ll just start somewhere and it will work itself out. This post will probably be very unorganized, but hopefully as they go on they will become clearer. 

The first question we must look at in discussing whether humans have the ability to make free choice is whether we live in a deterministic or indeterministic world. The physical world appears to be deterministic. That is, all events have earlier physical causes. Determinism posits that at every moment, there is only one possible future physically possible as a continuation of the state of the world at that moment. So the world the way is right now, is a direct product of the way the world was at the big bang, and the way the world was 3 billion years ago etc. 

So even though it feels as though we can do a lot of choosing, if determinism is true, there are no choices at all. The physicalist, who would generally be the determinist, says that human beings are merely complex physical objects. Therefore, our choices are causally determined the same way any other objects are causally determined. Although it may feel, or appear that we can choose – it is predetermined what choices we make. So the hard deterministic will ultimately say that human beings are merely physical objects thus have no real free will. There is another view, called soft determinism or compatibilism, which proposes that free will is compatible with a causally determined universe. I will talk about this in the next post. 

So perhaps the deterministic view is too rigid. Maybe it seems too extreme to claim EVERYTHING in the world is causally determined. After all, modern science seems to show that the world is at best, probabilistic on a sub-atomic level. The activity at the level of quarks and electrons is very probable, however not fully deterministic. Quantum Theory says that there is an element of randomness at the level of quarks and electrons that keeps it from being completely predictable. For example, although if I drop a ball on the ground it is highly probable (99.9999) that it will bounce off the molecules of the earth, there is a very small possibility that the ball will fall through the ground and come out on the other side of the plant, passing through a Quantum tunnel. So in the sense that physical activity is not 100% predictable, it is true to say the world we live in is indeterministic. 

However, I would argue that this sort of subatomic indeterminism has no bearing on whether or not we have free will. Even if we live an indeterministic world, we still cannot freely choose. Perhaps an example would help here. Let’s say I have a ‘choice’ between one of two options, I can sit at my desk or I can get up and drink some coffee. At the level of the brain, let us suppose that there is a two-way split in my neural pathway. If the neurons fire to the left, I will sit here at my desk and continue typing, but if they fire to the right, I will go to starbucks. It seems whether my neurons are physically determined or just subject to probabilistic physical laws, I have no choice either way. My choices are merely a result of a sort of chemical ‘tug-of-war’ in my brain, in which i play no role. The determinist would claim I remained in my seat because my neurons were causally determined to fire to the right. The indeterminist might argue that I remained her typing because it was highly probably that my neurons would fire right. However, the small probability that my neurons ‘could have’ fired left does not give me choice insofar as I am not in control of my electrical brain activity.

Interestingly, it is religious people who often like to think we have free will. God gave us free will so that we can somehow prove to him we are worthy. Or, free will is God’s greatest gift to mankind. Something along these lines. The idea of an omniscient being granting his subjects freedom is completely paradoxical however. If God knows everything there is too know, in that he is all powerful, then there would necessarily be no freedom. Insofar as God would know the future, we would be living in a completely deterministic world. And God, who is all-knowing, cannot not know the future. Therefore, we don’t make real choices.

 

Anyways, that’s enough for now. I’ll return to these issues later on. I just needed to start somewhere.