Presentism

In trying to conceptualize how space and time are related, we run into some very complicated puzzles. Probably, much of the complications one faces in considering how time and space are related is a result of trying to conceptualize temporality in terms of spatiality. It seems to me that time and space are of two entirely different sorts of concepts and trying to make time out to be a fourth special dimension is an over reification of a difficult abstract we may not yet grasp in order to relate it to the more concrete idea of space. I will thus defend presentism in hopes to show that time progressing spatially or linearly is mere fiction.

            Conventionally, we think of time as being one-dimensional. When we think in terms of time lines, we imagine linear progressions moving from the past, toward the future. We generally think of the present moment as flowing through time, much like a leaf flowing through a river in space. This metaphor, however, I think is metaphysically inaccurate and serves only to confuse us. Looking at the world this way, it is tempting to think of the present moment as a region in which events occur, for example the writing of this paper, The future and past are traditionally thought of as other regions in which other events occur, such as the grading of this paper or preparing to write this paper. However, when we reflect on our experiencing, it seems that all of life events take place in only the present moment. Thus it seems only the present is real. Reality, according to presentists like A.N. Prior, is simply a lack of temporal prefixes. There is a difference in speaking of writing my paper in the future, that it will be the case that I am writing a paper; or the past action being as it has been the case I am writing this paper. Pastness and futurity of an event is not the same as the event itself. However, presentness of an event is just the event and therefore the presentness of my writing this paper is just my writing of the paper. And because the present is the only real region of time, it follows that what is real and true is in constant flux or impermanent. Past or future moments only have existence in their remembrance or anticipation, yet they are only ever remembered or anticipated in the present moment – the only real region of time. So although time may superficially appear to be an endless succession of moments, if examined more carefully it becomes clear that there is only ever this moment.

            This is not to say that time is somehow less real than space, however. Our experience of time may be illusory, however the present moment is just as real as the concept of space. In his famous argument for the unreality of time, McTaggart seems to suggest that it is our traditional conception of time that is unreal. It seems to me that presentism is actually compatible with McTaggart’s argument however. Briefly, McTaggart differentiates two relational properties of time: A properties which are objective and fixed – “past”, “present”, and “future”; and B properties or transitive asymmetrical positions. B properties include relations such as “earlier than” or “later than”.  McTaggart argues that the A properties, however, are incompatible determinations because events cannot take place in multiple regions of time, namely the past, present and future. He argues that temporal exclusiveness is necessary or essential to change and thus time. Yet, McTaggart claims events do seem to have a pastness, nowness, and futurity. Yet these A properties are mutually exclusive and thus do not exist, or at least how we think them to exist. And it would follow that if there are no A properties, there can be no relational B properties. Therefore, time must be unreal.

            To the presentist, however, McTaggart’s argument seems to argue against premises about time that presentism doesn’t make. The presentist says nothing of the reality of future and past, and therefore any relational claims McTaggart is refuting is due to common-sensical misunderstandings of time or misuse of language and tenses. The refutation of these temporal relations perhaps even strengthens the presentists claim that there is no past or future realities. The presentists agree with McTaggart in the sense that it is logically impossible for events to have a pastness or futurity. Thus, only the present is what’s real.

            And if only the present is real, unlike space, it does not appear time is a vast plentum in which events can be spread across. Where as events can occur across a wide variety of points in space, there is only one point in time that events occur, namely the present. Interestingly however, while space seems to be vaster in terms of where events can occur, time is much more accommodating in terms of what kinds of events can occur. Space is very accommodating to physical objects. There are many physical beings spread out across the vast expanse we call space, located at many different points. However, in terms of immaterial objects, very little can be said of spatial location. We say, immaterial souls exist outside of space. However, even the very notion of something existing outside of something else lends itself to another spatial location. Time, that is the present moment, seems to be vastly more accommodating when it comes to immateriality. Even non-physical events, such as mental acts like thinking and feeling, all take place within the present moment. It also seems strange that in terms of space, two events cannot occupy the same point. That is, two physical objects cannot simultaneously occupy the same region in space. However, all physical objects occupy the same region in time, the present, simultaneously. If presentism is true, these differences between space and time are perplexing and seem to point to a fundamental difference between spatiality and temporality. 

(NYU year 2 Metaphysics)